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The high profile controversy over the rise of SWFs is one-but only one -of the frictions that result from the interaction of two very different conceptions of the role of government in a capitalist economy-what is commonly termed state versus market capitalism. 5 In the form of market capitalism that has developed in the advanced economies, to be sure with fits and starts, the individual company is the unit whose value is maximized. Prohibitions against government subsidies and preferences reflected in WTO and European Union rules are designed to prevent governments from shifting the level of profit maximization from the company to the state. In contrast, some major developing countries (China foremost among them) increasingly reflect a form of state capitalism -what we call the new mercantilism. In this form, the country is the unit whose value is to be maximized, with a corresponding increase in the role of the national government as a direct participant in and coordinator of the effort. For the developed economies, the belief that free trade and competition amongst companies increases GDP at the national level is an article of faith: the market polices the tautology. For developing economies, particularly those whose enterprises must compete with companies from more advanced economies, the state, acting through SWFs, through direct ownership of operating companies, and through regulation, seek to level the playing field. For the new mercantile capitalism, the government attempts to ensure that company-level behavior results in country-level maximization of economic, social, and political benefits.
Although SWFs constitute only one mechanism of state involvement in the economy, they have attracted great attention because for some commentators they are the current face of this tension between competing forms of capitalism. Lawrence Summers has pointed out that the cross-border activities of SWFs and other sovereign investment vehicles have reversed the trend toward privatization that swept over the globe in the past quarter century. 6 Governments are now accumulating stakes in what were purely private entities. As one commentator argues, "these trends [in the growth of SWFs and their
investment activities]…involve a dramatic increase in the role of governments in the ownership and management of national assets. This characteristic is unnerving and disquieting. It calls into question our most basic assumptions about the structure and functioning of our economies and the international financial system." and other national government bonds. Capital was recycled without economic or political disruption. 10 That pattern has changed, but for economic reasons, rather than because of changes in international relations or foreign policy. Many governments have recently announced plans to shift investment strategies for sovereign assets from conservative holdings of government bonds to higher risk/higher return investments in equities or corporate acquisitions. 11 Even the Norwegian Government Pension Fund, the most conservative of the sovereign wealth funds, has increased its allocation to equity by half -from 40 percent to 60 percent of its portfolio. 12 China has also signaled its intent to substantially increase its equity investments, both in its sovereign wealth funds, and in the portfolio of the government pension fund. 13 The announced reason for these changes in portfolio strategy is straightforward. Like the Bush administration's plan to shift social security investments into the capital markets, reserve rich countries say they are seeking the higher returns and greater diversification associated with investing in a broader range of asset classes.
The result has been a boom in high profile, and highly controversial investments.
The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority ("ADIA") recently acquired Citibank debt convertible into 4.9 percent of its common stock, which would make ADIA one of the 10 From time to time commentators noted that the U.S. had become reliant on these investments to finance its trade deficit, and U.S. policymakers sometimes expressed concern over the high level of U. Under the Exon-Florio regime, the inter-agency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (known as "CFIUS") reviews all notices of pending foreign acquisitions of control over U.S. companies and can recommend to the President that specific transactions be blocked because they pose a threat to national security. 24 The definition of "control" in the CFIUS regulations is quite broad. It is not a bright line majority ownership test; rather, CFIUS looks to the "functional abilities" of an acquirer to exercise control. 25 The regulations provide that there is no control when voting securities are held "solely for purposes of investment," which is defined in circular fashion to mean that the acquirer "has no intention of determining or directing the basic business decisions of the refunded. The recent capital infusions provided to U.S. financial institutions also softened the effects of the subprime mortgage crisis.
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The other face of foreign sovereign equity investments is the source of the controversy. Viewed from this side, national security concerns anchor one end of a continuum of issues concerning when the interests of a foreign government may differ from those of an ordinary shareholder. To illustrate the point, critics of the Abu Dhabi SWF investment in AMD expressed concern about industrial espionage, not just national security. 37 Similarly, consider SWFs' rapid infusion of capital into U.S. commercial and investment banks in the wake of the subprime writedowns. Few domestic financial institutions provided capital. If the investment opportunity was attractive in purely economic terms, why were the SWFs the principal investors? Perhaps the investments were attractive to SWFs because they got something more than a purely financial investment. Or perhaps SWF investments were particularly attractive to the current managers of the investment banks struggling with subprime writedowns because they could act quickly and were thought unlikely either to agitate for change or to seek control, an unusual combination of characteristics for investors in companies whose operating strategies created the need for massive capital investments in the first place 38 Efforts to diffuse this tension between the benign and threatening faces of sovereign wealth fund equity investments requires a strategy of regulatory minimalism, one that does not spill over beyond addressing the potential conflict of interest between the foreign government and ordinary shareholders to impair the critical capital market benefits that flow from recycling large trade deficits. This is where corporate governance enters the analysis: policing conflicts of interest among participants in the firm has always been corporate governance's forte.
We propose a simple corporate governance fix that provides such a minimalist strategy. Under this approach, the equity of a U.S. firm acquired by a foreign government controlled entity would lose its voting rights, but would regain them when transferred to non-state ownership. The result is to separate control from investment value; the expected returns to a foreign sovereign equity investor remain identical to those of other shareholders, while losing direct influence over management through voting. Sovereign investors with purely financial motives will still invest; the proposal does not raise the cost of their investments. Sovereigns seeking strategic benefits from equity investments, however, will find SWFs to be a less attractive vehicle by which to achieve their ends. This adjustment mitigates the potential conflict of interest concern that animates the SWF debate without affecting the benefits that SWFs bring to the capital market.
Some may perceive our proposal as protectionist. But to do so is to misconstrue the impact of vote suspension. Vote suspension is protectionist only in the sense that it operates on the frictions between competing versions of capitalism; market-based capitalist regimes are protected against incursion by new mercantilist regimes. But unlike a truly protectionist measure designed to protect domestic companies' commercial interests rather than the integrity of the structure of a form of capitalism, our proposal would not lower investment values for foreign investors on account of their nationality or sovereign affiliation per se. Moreover, as we discuss below, we fully anticipate that other countries would respond by imposing reciprocal treatment on investment funds controlled by U.S. government entities.
Our proposal is not a perfect solution to the tensions raised by SWFs. It is under inclusive, in that influence can be exercised by means other than voting; a significant shareholder need not always cast a vote to sway management. It is also over inclusive, in that even regulatory minimalism will spill over to unintended areas. As just noted, we expect that countries whose SWFs are subject to the vote suspension rule in the United
States would respond in kind; thus, U.S. state investment funds such as the Alaskan Permanent Revenue Fund (among the largest SWFs in the world) may be treated reciprocally by other countries. 39 Despite its imperfections, vote suspension does serve to constrain a major source over concern over SWF investment without creating a barrier to recycling trade surpluses.
To be sure, vote suspension does not address the more deeply rooted and significant frictions that arise from the interactions of different capitalist systems, which do involve issues of real protectionism. However, it does effectively address the high profile concern over SWFs that, left unaddressed or addressed too broadly, has the potential to seriously disrupt the global capital market through heavy handed regulation and protectionism. 39 Although it does not share some of the key characteristics of a sovereign wealth fund, we expect that even CalPERS could be subject to reciprocal treatment abroad. For further discussion, see infra TAN.
Part I of this Essay describes the SWF phenomenon with a focus on the significant changes that have propelled these institutions to the forefront of debate in the global capital markets: their rapid growth and recent shift in investment strategy.
Part II explores the two faces of SWF equity investments-one benign, the other threatening. The benign face is the prosaic desire of any investor to achieve higher returns and greater diversification, particularly in response to changes in the global markets and increasing liabilities resulting from demographic trends. The threatening face is the possibility that SWFs may invest for strategic rather than purely investment motives, raising the specter of national security threats, industrial espionage, and similar harms to core interests of any sovereign state. Disentangling these two faces provides a better perspective from which to craft a response to the SWF controversy.
In Part III, we present our minimalist solution-vote suspension for SWF equity investments. We explain why this solution responds to the potentially threatening side of SWF investments while leaving the benign face undisturbed. Part IV examines the limitations of our solution, and explains why these limitations are outweighed by the benefits of vote suspension. Part V concludes.
I. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Phenomenon
Despite the recent explosion of attention and concern, the earliest sovereign wealth funds are more than 50 years old and, until recently, have operated in relative obscurity. But while these are not new institutions in global finance, the economic landscape in which they operate has changed in two dramatic ways. government debt outstanding. 53 The decline of the dollar vis-à-vis the euro and other major currencies has reduced the attractiveness of dollar-denominated financial instruments to foreign holders. Moreover, the quest for higher returns, common to all investors, is made more acute by demographic trends in many reserve rich countries.
Aging societies in East Asia, for example, will place huge financial burdens on their national public pension systems because in the coming decades fewer workers will be supporting more retirees. To help bridge the shortfall, planners must seek higher returns on publicly held retirement assets.
A final factor influencing the recent formation and investment strategies of SWFs is that success breeds imitation. Some government investment funds, particularly 
II. Two Faces of SWF Equity Investments
At first take, it may be hard to understand why non-controlling equity investments by SWFs are controversial. The benefits are straightforward. Equity investments serve to recycle trade surpluses and to increase the supply of funds to the equity market, reducing the cost of capital, just as foreign government investment of foreign reserves in U.S. government debt instruments has reduced interest rates in the United States. Equity investment, as compared to investment in debt, is also more stable, in that its withdrawal is less disruptive than withdrawal from the debt market. 57 Indeed, because equity investments reflect long term values, these investments leave SWFs hostage to the health of the economies in whose corporations they invest. Unlike government debt, the SWFs cannot hold equity investments until they mature and decline to reinvest. Rather, equity investments must be sold to a willing buyer in light of any change in circumstances, suggested that the lack of transparency of SWFs may mask market abuses such as insider trading, which if widespread, could raise the cost of capital by undermining investor confidence in the market. 59 But regardless of how many times it is invoked, the lack of transparency cannot itself be the problem, and as a result greater transparency cannot itself be the solution.
The fact is that all shareholdings are non-transparent unless the disclosure regime of a particular jurisdiction imposes a disclosure obligation. companies and of those who seek to influence control through a proxy fight or tender offer, as well as periodic disclosure of mutual fund holdings. 60 Additionally, an equity sale by a public company of a significant equity stake, even if less than five percent, must be promptly disclosed. This was the case with the Abu Dhabi SWF investment in Citigroup. However, there is no general disclosure requirement for shareholders that hold less than five percent of a company's equity. As a result, the equity holdings of most suggests that the principal concern with SWF equity investments is that they may have a significant strategic element driven by self-interest. The fear is that SWFs will use their influence on portfolio companies to secure technology (a concern raised explicitly in the discussion of the Abu Dhabi fund's investment in AMD), gain access to natural resources, improve competitive positions for domestic companies, or in a fashion that has national security concerns for the portfolio company's country of incorporation. To be sure, no one can point to a reported incidence of such behavior. However, the debate takes the potential for such behavior (and the logic) extremely seriously.
III. A Minimalist Solution: Vote Suspension
If the problem with SWF investments is that some funds have strategic, rather than investment motives, or have the potential to support strategic behavior should circumstances change in the future (in effect, strategic option value), then the appropriate response is quite straightforward, at least at the conceptual level: constrain strategic Again, transparency, whether mandated or encouraged through codes of best practicethe ubiquitous current policy response to concerns of SWFs--does not address the real problem. 63 Additional disclosure simply cannot distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic investors. 62 We do not mean to single out specific foreign governments or foreign governments in general as having great influence vis-à-vis economic actors. All governments have such influence. Recall that only one U.S. telecommunications company refused to comply with a request by the National Security Agency to turn over phone call records of their customers in the interests of national security-a request with a questionable legal foundation and concerning which Congress has been asked to provide retroactive immunity. All of the major telecommunications companies turned over the call histories of their customers without objection. See Leslie Cauley, NSA has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls, U.S.A. Today, May 11, 2006. 63 For example, a senior U.S. Treasury official lists five policy principles that should be followed by SWFs. Among these, the first is that SWFs should invest commercially, not politically. The second is that SWFs should be transparent about their investment policies as a means of conveying world class investor This leads us to a response that focuses on corporate governance. The corporate governance system represents the complex of mechanisms by which a corporation makes decisions. They include management practices and organizational routines, as well as the formal procedures specified in state corporation statutes and elaborated in judicial decisions by the courts in the corporation's state of incorporation. Thus, the corporate governance system also represents the structure through which an SWF investor must channel its efforts to influence the corporation in its portfolio to act in the SWF'sb, as opposed to the corporation's, interests.
In important circumstances, the formal elements of corporate governance have great importance. In the end, even the informal, non-legal elements operate in the shadow of the formal, legally dictates decision structures. Suppose a corporation's senior executives resist efforts by a significant SWF shareholder to influence the corporation's decisions in a fashion favorable to the SWF, for example, by declining to authorize technology transfer arrangements with corporations in the SWF's jurisdiction. In that event, the SWF shareholder can seek to have the board of directors replace the recalcitrant managers. If that fails, the SWF can seek to persuade other shareholders to join with it and replace the board. Thus, an SWF's informal influence depends on its formal influence -its ability to vote its shares.
If an SWF shareholder's influence depends on its ability to vote its shares, then the obvious means to prevent strategic behavior -behavior that benefits the SWF or its sovereign owner in ways that do not proportionately benefit other shareholders -is to restrict an SWF's right to vote. Shares of U.S. companies acquired by an SWF would integrity. Kimmitt, supra note __. While these are completely laudable goals, a commitment by an SWF to abide by these principles is not credible because there is no mechanism that bonds the SWF to its promise.
lose their voting rights (or automatically be voted in the same proportion as the votes on non-SWF shareholders).
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Of course, the expected objection to eliminating the voting rights of SWF-held shares is that it will reduce the shares' value -non-voting shares are worth less than voting shares. It is this observation that fuels the ultimately mistaken view that our proposal is protectionist because it reduces the value of foreign SWF shares. The problem is exacerbated because an SWF's motives for investing cannot be accurately observed; without more, the proposal does not successfully walk the line between strategic and non-strategic investors. Because a statement by the SWF that it operates independently of its government owner or that is has only non-strategic investment motives is not credible, the loss of voting rights must apply to all SWFs, even if most SWFs in fact have solely traditional investment motives (or the value of the strategic option to the particular SWF -say Norway -is small). The result will be to discourage all SWFs from investing, not just those with the feared strategic motives; all SWFs will have to pay the higher price of voting shares, but will receive only lower value nonvoting shares. One would expect that the important beneficial aspects of SWF capital recycling then would be compromised. This is hardly regulatory minimalism, and our will not be deterred.
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IV. The Limits of Vote Suspension
Suspending the voting rights of SWF-held shares, while reflecting a minimalist approach to regulation, is not entirely successful in eliminating regulatory clutter; it is 65 More precisely, the vote suspension rule operates as a kind of forcing contract that results in a separating equilibrium -one in which SWFs with non-strategic motives continue to invest and those with strategic motives do not -without further government action. The success of the effort depends on the strategically motivated investors having alternative investments -like controlling acquisitions -that are more attractive to them because of their strategic value, but which will not be more attractive to non-strategic investors.
nonetheless both under and over inclusive. The under inclusion is the more important, although it is less politically charged than the effects of over inclusion. On balance, neither under-or over-inclusion presents a significant counterweight to the self-enforcing character of vote suspension.
A. The Problem of Under Inclusion
The most significant way in which suspending the voting rights of SWF-held shares is under inclusive results from the simple fact that using the formal corporate governance system to influence a portfolio company's decision-making to the SWF's strategic advantage, whether directly or through its impact on informal governance mechanisms, is not the only way an SWF can seek to secure a strategic advantage from a portfolio firm. In turn, an SWF is not the only vehicle through which a government can act strategically to influence a foreign corporation's decisions.
Even if the voting rights of SWF-held shares are suspended, the SWF still may be able to strategically influence the portfolio company's decisions to the extent that the portfolio company hopes for future capital infusions from the SWF; simple reciprocity can operate without the SWF having to invoke the portfolio company's formal governance structure because the future also casts a shadow. So long as the portfolio company knows what the SWF wants, the portfolio company's desire for future equity capital on favorable terms may allow the SWF to influence the portfolio company's behavior despite its lack of voting rights.
While this concern cannot be dismissed entirely, constraints exist that cabin this kind of strategic tit-for-tat. Most important, the generally applicable disclosure requirements governing public corporations in developed economies will provide a level of transparency that constrains the portfolio company's freedom to secure future capital by advancing the SWF's strategic interests. In most developed economies, the new issuance of shares of a magnitude large enough to support reciprocity will trigger disclosure of the issuance by the portfolio company. Such disclosure of the SWF's interests alerts other large shareholders, as well as the domestic government, to the risk of strategic influence.
It is also likely that existing generally applicable corporate disclosure rules will mandate portfolio company disclosure of commercial transactions of a size large enough to significantly advance the interests of the SWF's government. For example, in the U.S.
a material transaction between the portfolio company and a government controlled company likely would require explicit disclosure by the portfolio company as part of its continuous disclosure obligation under U.S. securities laws. That disclosure, in turn, could also lead to state corporate law enforcement of rules governing self-interested transactions.
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To be sure, one could imagine an SWF initiating a reciprocal exchange not by buying new shares, but by buying shares in the secondary market with the goal of artificially supporting the portfolio company's stock price and, therefore, reducing its cost of new capital from others. But this pattern presents a disclosure problem as well.
Issuing new capital to the public at the SWF-supported price will require that the portfolio company disclose the expected reciprocity (if the company does not know the strategy, reciprocity is impossible), which will operate to dissipate the effect of the price support, and a failure to disclose it will subject portfolio company managers to 66 See, e.g., ALI Principles of Corporate Governance, Part V. In the limited circumstances where these techniques have been observed, the company typically is not willing to cooperate with the party seeking to influence the company's behavior. 68 The debate over SWFs, in contrast, is largely over cooperative arrangements, where the SWF's investment is desired by the company. In a non-cooperative circumstance, efforts to avoid the voting suspension can be detected by the portfolio company and can be challenged under state corporate law.
While theoretically possible, we do not view empty voting techniques as being a significant factor in the SWF debate.
B. The Problem of Over Inclusion
Suspending the voting rights of SWF-held equity is also over inclusive because it will impact entities other than foreign SWFs. To this point, our discussion has treated equity investments by SWFs and government pension funds as creating equivalent risks of strategic behavior. For the purpose of assessing over inclusion, the role of government pension funds takes on special prominence. From the perspective of the U.S., the over inclusion problem results from the expectation that governments whose SWFs and pension funds have their voting rights suspended will impose similar suspensions on the equity holdings of comparable U.S. government entities. Unless the U.S. Social Security System is reorganized to allow it to make equity investments, as the 69 This effort, which is not strategic because all shareholders benefit equally from it, does require voting rights. Its loss will be felt not only by the U.S. funds with respect to their existing investments -future investments will be at prices that reflect the loss of pressure for good governance -but also by other companies selling equity in those markets, where a reduction in the pressure for more effective corporate governance can be expected to increase the cost of capital. An optimistic view is that the cost will be relatively small. The successful movement toward higher corporate governance standards across the developed world makes the role U.S. state pension funds have played less central to the effort to improve corporate governance standards. To be sure, this is a cost, but we think not a large one. 69 See CalPERS, Global Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance, available at http://www.calpersgovernance.org/principles/international/global/downloads/global-corpgov-principles.pdf (describing policies for developing nations and other countries)
V. Conclusion
The high profile controversy over SWFs' shift to equity investments is only one of the frictions that result from the interaction of two very different conceptions of the role of government in a capitalist economy. But because this form of portfolio investment in private firms by government-controlled funds, unlike investments of controlling stakes by SOEs, currently falls outside national regulatory regimes, it has raised considerable concern over a potential loss of sovereignty and distortion of markets.
Not surprisingly then, SWFs have sparked a wave of protectionist sentiment in the more market-oriented polities.
Suspension of the voting rights of SWFs addresses one facet of the competition between market and new mercantilist capitalism. It solves the immediate problem at which it is addressed -the use of a portfolio company's corporate governance structure to influence its decisions in a fashion that works to the advantage of the SWF's government owner at the expense of the portfolio company's other shareholders and potentially the host country itself. This solution cannot solve the larger problems that arise from the interaction of different concepts of capitalism, but it can address the most serous risk SWFs pose: that the perception of strategic behavior by foreign state owned entities will result in a protectionist backlash. If vote suspension reduces the risk of a protectionist response, it will allow the global markets to demonstrate that, in the long run, governments make ineffective capitalists, especially where innovation is the ultimate currency. Buying time to allow the competition between the two systems of capitalism to work itself out is no small matter. 
